Electronically Filed

5/24/2019 2:33 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Brad Thies,

Deputy Clerk

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
E-mail:

nolsen@pmholaw.com

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JACKIE MARIE RAYMOND,
as an heir,

individually

and as Personal Representative 0f

the Estate of

Idaho Supreme Court

Docket N0. 46272-20 1 8

BARRY JOHNSON,
Fayette C0. District Court

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. CV-2015-954

V.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

IDAHO STATE POLICE,

an Idaho State

agency,

Defendant—Respondent,

and

PAYETTE COUNTY, a political subdivision
SCOTT SLOAN, and
JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,
of the State 0f Idaho,

Defendants.

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
0f the State 0f Idaho, in and for the County of Fayette
Honorable Christopher S. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.

PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN

Michael J. Elia, Esq.
Marisa S. Credelius, Esq.

485 “E”

MOORE,

Street

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Attorney for Appellant,
Jackie Marie

Raymond

ELIA, KRAFT
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

& HALL

Attorney for Respondent, Idaho State Police

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGUMENT
Respondent Downplays and/or Ignores the Bulk 0f Appellant’s Plead Facts
Which Must be Considered as if True under a Rule (12)(6) Motion 0f which
this Court can review de novo.

II.

III.

Idaho Recognizes a Third Party Spoliation 0f Evidence Claim, the Concerns
0f which Expressed by the California Supreme Court in Temple County
Hospital Have Been and Are Easily Diffused.

The Appellant has Plead a Valid and Justiﬁed Claim

for Negligent and/or

Intentional Spoliation 0f Evidence.

IV.

V.

VI.

11

The Respondent’s Alleged Immoral Conduct and the Severity 0f the Harm
t0 Appellant Rises t0 the Level 0f a “Prima Facia” Tort under Restatement
§ 870.

14

The Respondent’s Inherently Wrongful Conduct, and the Character 0f the
Wrongful Conduct Itself Naturally Results in Damages that Can be
Determined by the Jury.

17

N0

21

Basis Exists for the

CONCLUSION

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 2

Awarding 0f Respondent’s Attorney

Fees.

22

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aikens

Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S.Ct. 3, 49 L.Ed. 154 (1904))

v.

Billingsley

Brannon

v.

v.

Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance

C0,,

SD35102

Diana
Hills

June

18,

2018)

15

.............

......................

4

.............................

6

.......................................

7

1150, 1160 (1999)

NetJets Services, Inc., 974 A.2d 841, 849 (Conn.Super. 2007)

v.

United Parcel Service, Ina, 232 P.3d 1049, 1053-58 (Utah 2010) .................................... 9

v.

Oliver

(dec.

City ofCoeurD’Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 847, 292 P.3d 234, 239 (2012)

Cook v. Idaho Dep. Transp. 133 Idaho 288, 298, 985 P.2d

15

.........................................

Stimpson Lumber C0. 297 Mont. 336, 993 P.2d 11 (1999).

v.

Ricketts

(2002)

v.

..............................

11, 19,

20

Eastern Idaho Equipment, C0. Ina, 137 Idaho 578, 581-82, 51 P.3d 392, 395-96

.............................................................................................................................................

Rizzuto

Davidson Ladders, Ina, 280 Conn. 225, 243, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006)

v.

..........................

6
7

v. Paterson Parchment Paper C0., 51 S.Ct. 248, 250-51, 282 U.S. 555,
564-65 75 (1931) ........................................................................................................................... 19

Story Parchment C0.

Temple County Hospital

Yoakum

v.

v.

Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 464, 473-476 (1999) ................................. 6

Hartford Fire Ins. C0., 129 Idaho 171, 175 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996)

..............

4, 5, 15

Other Authorities
22
22
22

Am Jur 2d Damages
Am Jur 2d Damages
Am Jur 2d Damages

29 ......................................................................................................... 18
§ 42 ......................................................................................................... 18
§ 43 ......................................................................................................... 18
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition ............................................................................................ 4

IAR § 41

§

........................................................................................................................................

Rest. Torts, 2nd

21

§ 870 ..................................................................................................................... 15

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 3

ARGUMENT
Respondent Downplays and/or Ignores the Bulk 0f Appellant’s Plead Facts
which Must be Considered as if True under a Rule (12)(6) Motion as Reviewed
de novo by this Court.

I.

Respondent’s Response brief foregoes reciting a “Statement 0f Facts,” but instead
provides a general “Statement 0f the Case” which focuses 0n only a few paragraphs 0f
Appellant/Plaintiff” s complaint, while ignoring

most 0f the

plaintiff s allegations. Resp. Brief

pp. 1-2. Respondent then suggests that the Appellant/Plaintiff’ s complaint and appeal consists of

“vague assertions” that

“it

cannot prepare a

Such an approach by the Respondent
the standard of review in this case

granting 0f an

party

IRCP

motion

§ 12(b)(6)

would be unable

t0

Which

is

response t0.” Id. pp. 2-3.

full

is

misleading and suggests that

Court to consider

to dismiss

prove any conceivable

this

Court disregard

a de novo review of whether the district court’s

was appropriate because

set

the

“non-moving

0f facts in support 0f its claim.” Yoakum

Hartford Fire Ins. C0., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996).
this

this

v.

A de novo review allows

matter “anew; afresh; a second time.” See Black’s

Law Dictionary,

Sixth Edition. Additionally, this Court “exercises free review over questions of law.

”

Brannon

v.

City ofCoeurD'Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 847, 292 P.3d 234, 239 (2012) (citations omitted). Thus,

as clearly set forth

and asserted

in the Appellant’s Brief, the real issue before this

whether upon taking a fresh 0r second look

drawn

in the favor

is

complaint in

its

entirety

and with

all

is

inferences

0f the Appellant/Plaintiff, has the Appellant plead an actionable claim that can

or should be recognized

This

at the

Court

by

law.

clearly a perspective that the

Respondent would prefer

given the comprehensive and shocking allegations
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made

that this

Court avoid —

in the complaint, as referred t0 With

clarity in the Appellant’s Brief.

Plaintiff/Appellant Jackie

State Police (ISP)

accident killing

on a

App]. Br. pp. 5-7. R. V01. Ipp. 3 1-35. In summary, the

Raymond (Raymond)

— Who was charged with the

Raymond’s

residential road

—

father caused

suppressing and altering a report

reckless. Id.

responsibility With investigating a horriﬁc

by a Fayette County deputy traveling over 115

MPH

did in fact take measures t0 conceal, destroy 0r otherwise tamper With

evidence and testimony to protect the

were

alleges that the Defendant/Respondent Idaho

Raymond

by

liability

its

own

of the deputy and the county, including

investigatory agents ﬁnding that the deputy’s actions

further alleges that such actions

by the ISP not only

interfered With,

delayed and reduced the amount 0f damages that she should have received under her wrongful
death claim, but that ISP’S actions caused severe emotional distress and anxiety and other
general and special damages.

Raymond

is

simply recommending t0

this

de nova and free review over whether Idaho does or should recognize a
conduct by the ISP and

Raymond’s

its

agents.

Viewed

in that appropriate light, this

Court that

tort for this

it

exercise a

horrendous

Court should grant

appeal.

Idaho Recognizes a Third Party Spoliation 0f Evidence Claim, the Concerns 0f
which Expressed by the California Supreme Court in Temple County Hospital
Have Been and Are Easily Diffused.

II.

Respondent attempts

“framework
Ins. C0.,

claim to

to pass

of as mere “dicta” the “guidance in future litigation” and

for another cause 0f action” provided

by this Court

129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996).

move forward simply because

it

in in
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it

v.

Harzford Fire

The Yoakum Court did not allow such a

held that the alleged facts in that particular case were

not “egregious” enough t0 warrant a claim. Id. However, this Court
several other subsequent opinions that

Yoakum

would recognize a

made

it

clear as

it

third party spoliation claim

has in

under the

right set

of facts.

Id.

See also Ricketts

Eastern Idaho Equipment, C0. Ina, 137 Idaho 578,

v.

Cook v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 133 Idaho

581-82, 51 P.3d 392, 395-96 (2002) and

288, 298, 985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999). Respondent points to no Idaho authority Which expressly
rejects a third party spoliation claim.

Instead,

Respondent

Temple County Hospital
California

v.

relies heavily

upon a 1999

California

Supreme Court decision

Superior Court, 20 Ca1.4th 464 (1999), Which determined that

would n0 longer recognize a

never referenced 0r relied upon

third party spoliation cause of action. Again, Idaho has

this California decision,

Which therefore makes

this case. Nevertheless, the reasons that the California court

it

inapplicable in

provided for not allowing such a

Claim have been debunked and criticized in several other subsequent decisions from other
jurisdictions, including neighboring states such as

Montana and Utah.

The Temple County Hospital Court justiﬁes

its

decision

by claiming

that recognizing a

cause 0f action for a third party spoliation claim would “produce endless derivative litigation”

and

that

damages

are “irreducibly uncertain.” Id.

that third party spoliation

20

Cal.4th at 473-76.

The Court

also suggests

can be remedied by contempt orders, sanctions, criminal statutes

and/or other yet-to-be fashioned remedies

by the

California legislature. Id. at 476.

California’s feeble attempt t0 address the troubling implications of third party spoliation

0f evidence has not been accepted or followed by numerous other jurisdictions. Nor have such
jurisdictions allowed the fears expressed

by California

t0

outweigh the potential harms and

wrongfulness of third party spoliation that an independent cause 0f action would remedy and
deter.

A worthy analysis 0f the pros of allowing such a claim is provided by the Connecticut

Supreme Court

in

two 0f its opinions
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in

2007 and 2007

respectively.

In 2006, the Connecticut

Supreme Court recognized a

tort for ﬁrst party intentional

spoliation 0f evidence as an independent tort, noting that "the existing nontort remedies are

insufﬁcient to compensate Victims of spoliation and to deter ﬁlture spoliation

When

a ﬁrst party

defendant destroys evidence intentionally with the purpose and effect of precluding a plaintiff

from fulﬁlling

his

burden 0f production in a pending 0r impending case."

Rizzuto

v.

Davidson

Ladders, Ina, 280 Conn. 225, 243, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006). In so doing, the Rizzuto Court

acknowledges other available remedies for spoliation,

i.e.

sanctions, criminal statutes, etc.

..

but

ultimately concluded that such remedies “provide an insufﬁcient compensatory and deterrent
effect”

and d0 not “compensate the

plaintiff for the loss

of his underlying

civil action." Id., at

242.
In 2007, the Connecticut

Supreme Court

also recognized an independent cause 0f action

for a third party intentional spoliation of evidence claim, again rebutting the concerns raised

California in Temple

Community Hospital. Diana

v.

by

NetJets Services, Ina, 974 A.2d 841, 849

(Conn.Super. 2007). The Connecticut Court was undeterred by the “irreducible certainty of

damages” argument,

stating:

We agree that this difﬁculty of proof is endemic to the tort of spoliation.
that

it

should preclude recognition of the

tort...

The difﬁculty

.

.but

we

in determining the

disagree

harm

caused by a defendant's spoliation of evidence is attributable solely to the defendant's
intentional bad faith litigation misconduct. If the plaintiff could establish precisely What
the spoliated evidence

would have shown,

the tort

would be unnecessary because

plaintiff would possess sufﬁcient evidence to satisfy his

underlying

litigation.

Id.
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the

burden of production in the

The Connecticut Court

further “acknowledges:”

most difﬁcult aspect of a spoliation 0f evidence tort is the calculation 0f
damages.... In determining the proper measure of damages, we are guided by the purpose
of compensatory damages, Which is to restore an injured party to the position he or she
would have been in if the wrong had not been committed... To restore a Victim of
intentional spoliation 0f evidence to the position he or she would have been in if the
spoliation had not occurred, the plaintiff is entitled t0 recover the full amount of
compensatory damages that he or she would have received if the underlying action had
been pursued successfully... We recognize that various jurisdictions have criticized this
measure of damages because there is the potential that the plaintiff would beneﬁt more in
an instance 0f spoliation than he might have in the underlying suit... We conclude,
however, that the risk 0f a Windfall to the plaintiff sufﬁciently is minimized by requiring
that, [t]he

the plaintiff t0 prove that the defendant spoliated evidence intentionally with the purpose

and

effect

0f precluding the plaintiffs

ability t0 establish a

prima facie case in the

underlying litigation and, further, by permitting the defendant t0 rebut the presumption of
liability that arises upon this showing.
Id. at

849

(citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

The Connecticut Supreme Court
contemporaneous 0r subsequent

also thoroughly

debunks the concern 0f “a

collateral or satellite litigation

conduct” warned about in other jurisdictions.

Id.

0f

based on allegations of spoliating

The Court “dismissed”

with respect to the risk of meritless spoliation actions,

spiral

we do

this assertion:

not agree

that recognition

of the tort Will result in an uncontrollable inﬂux of frivolous claims.... [T]he limited scope
0f the
rules

tort,

the difﬁculty 0f proof inherent in the tort and the safeguards

0f practice

embodied

in our

are sufﬁcient t0 deter the ﬁling of such meritless actions.

Lastly, the tort of intentional spoliation 0f evidence, as

deﬁned

in this state, poses

no

risk

ofjury confusion, inconsistent verdicts 0r duplicative litigation because the underlying
claim and the tort of intentional spoliation 0f evidence are mutually exclusive. In other
words, a plaintiff Who possesses sufﬁcient evidence to present his underlying claim to the
jury necessarily

is

unable to

state a

claim for intentional spoliation 0f evidence, and Vice

versa. Thus, the risk ofjury confusion, inconsistent verdicts or duplicative litigation

eliminated entirely.

Id. at

949-50.
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is

As

further indicated

by the Connecticut Supreme Court, a strong argument

particular for a third party spoliation claim

due

t0 a “lack

exists in

0f remedies available to third party

spoliation Victims” noting that:

the evidentiary inference

a person

who

is

most discovery sanctions

as well as

not a party t0 the litigation and

Who

is

are not available

when

not an agent of a party

intentionally has destroyed evidence. .because the nontort remedies for third party
.

spoliation, unlike those for ﬁrst party spoliation, are not strong

and effective

deterrents,

weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a tort remedy for third party
law seeks not only t0 deter wrongful conduct but also t0 compensate
those injured by such conduct. The nontort remedies for third party spoliation d0 not,
however, compensate the Victim for the harm caused by the destruction 0f evidence,
unlike the nontort remedies for ﬁrst party spoliation.
this factor

spoliation... Tort

Id. at

85 1.
Finally, in a resounding rejection

the Connecticut

which

"Nor would a

states:

litigation... It

[T]here

is

Supreme Court

would

tort

cites the

remedy

of the majority ruling in Temple Community Hospital

more sound reasoning found

in the dissenting opinion

for intentional third party spoliation create ‘endless'

create a single lawsuit

between the spoliation Victim and the

nothing unique about third party spoliation in

extent 0f harm, for almost every tort can present the

its

spoliator....

potential for uncertainty in the fact or

same uncertainty.” Id.

(citing dissenting

opinion of Justice Kennard in Temple Community Hospital).

Using a
that

fairly similar analysis as Connecticut,

and referencing

at least

have adopted a third party spoliation of evidence claim, the neighboring

also recognized an independent claim for third party spoliation of evidence.

Parcel Service, Ina, 232 P.3d 1049, 1053-58 (Utah 2010) (See

from twelve

states in alphabetical order).

ft.

twelve other states

state

0f Utah has

Hills

v.

United

2 for a recitation 0f decisions

In reviewing the twenty—ﬁve year history and

treatment of the issue in numerous jurisdictions throughout the country, the Utah Supreme Court
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suggests a “general pattern” trending toward the acceptance of a third party intentional spoliation

0f evidence cause 0f action.
for the State

Id. at

1056.

The Court then proceeds

t0 adopt

such a cause 0f action

of Utah, ﬁnding:

The preference
I (sic)

fairly

for a third party spoliation tort is

even more defensible. Like most courts,

agree that traditional nontort remedies adequately deter ﬁrst-party spoliation and

compensate Victims. Without creating a new cause 0f action, there are

still

a

variety of remedies available t0 punish spoliators, deter future spoliators, and protect

nonspoliators prejudiced

by evidence

a different picture. Almost

all

spoliation-acknowledge that

destruction. Third party spoliation, however, paints

states—including those that have refused t0 adopt a tort 0f

when

dealing With third party spoliators, traditional nontort

remedies such as evidentiary inferences, discovery sanctions, and attorney disciplinary

measures are unavailable 0r largely ineffectual. .Accordingly, While most states have
rejected a cause 0f action for ﬁrst-party spoliation, nearly all jurisdictions that have
.

adopted the

tort in

some form recognize

a tort for third party spoliation. In other words, if

a state were t0 adopt any form 0f spoliation

tort, it

would most

likely

be a third party

intentional spoliation tort.

Id.

Simply put, Idaho would be on solid footing by allowing a
spoliation of evidence claim to

move forward in this

case.

The

third party intentional

so-called downsides 0f such a

claim and availability of alternative remedies to address spoliation cited by the California

Supreme Court nearly twenty years ago

in

Temple County Hospital are

in actuality largely

unfounded, easily refuted, and outweighed by the greater good that allowing an independent
claim will achieve. Egregious and intentional wrongful conduct such as the destruction and

tampering 0f evidence by a third party that protects a wrong doer from

frowned upon,

results in

harm, and should therefore be actionable.
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liability

should be

The Appellant has Plead a Valid and Justiﬁed Claim

III.

for Negligent and/or

Intentional Spoliation of Evidence.

December of 1999, approximately

Interestingly, in

six

months

after the ﬁling

0f the

Temple County Hospital decision, the Montana Supreme Court issued an opinion of its own
regarding both a third party negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action.
Oliver

v.

Stimpson Lumber C0. 297 Mont. 336, 993 P.2d 11 (1999). The Montana Court

provides a solid and reasoned approach that this Court should consider in the crafting of such a
tort in Idaho.

In Oliver, the plaintiff ﬁled a complaint containing an independent cause of action against

his former

employer and

its

insurer for

knowingly or negligently

altering

and discarding a piece

0f equipment that would have been key evidence in a claim the plaintiff was considering against
a third party for severe personal injuries involving the equipment.

dismissed the

plaintiff” s

Id. at

339-41. The

trial

court

complaint for both negligent and intentional spoliation, after which the

plaintiff appealed. Id. at 441.

The Oliver Court partially granted

the plaintiff’s appeal, but in so doing establishes

elements for a third party cause of action for both a negligent and intentional spoliation 0f
evidence claim.

Id. at

347-354. The Court sets forth a well-reasoned basis for allowing such

claims against third parties and

When evidence

why existing remedies

are insufﬁcient.

of a third party, however, the various sanctions
available t0 the trial judge are inapplicable and other considerations arise. For instance,
the property in question may be owned by the third party. A property owner normally has
is

in the possession

the right to control and dispose 0f his property as he sees ﬁt.

may legitimately question What right
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The owner 0f the property

a plaintiff has t0 direct control over such property.

Yet, the importance of evidence preservation and the critical importance
civil justice

Id. at

it

plays in the

system cannot be ignored.

345.

The Court

lays out the elements 0f a Negligent Spoliation 0f Evidence

Claim

as follows:

existence 0f a potential civil action;

a legal 0r contractual duty t0 preserve evidence relevant to that action;
9999!"?

destruction of that evidence;

signiﬁcant impairment of the ability t0 prove the potential civil action;

a causal connection between the destruction of the evidence and the inability t0

prove the lawsuit;
a signiﬁcant possibility of success 0f the potential civil action if the evidence were
available;
7.

and

damages.

Id. at 347.

The Court

further delineates the various

manners

in

which a “duty t0 preserve evidence”

can be established in a third party negligent spoliation claim:
1.

the spoliator voluntarily undertakes t0 preserve the evidence and a person

reasonably relies 0n

it

to his detriment;

the spoliator entered into an agreement t0 preserve the evidence;
U)

there has
there

is

been a speciﬁc request

a duty t0 d0 so based

to the spoliator to preserve the evidence; or

upon a

contract, statute, regulation, or

some other

special circumstance/relationship.

Id.

Noting that the “intentional destruction 0f evidence
right of recovery

is

t0 disrupt 0r defeat another person's

highly improper and cannot be justified,” the Montana Court also provides

elements for an alternative claim for a third party intentional spoliation 0f evidence claim:

1.

the existence of a potential lawsuit;
the defendant's

knowledge 0f the

potential lawsuit;

9°.“

the intentional destruction 0f evidence designed t0 disrupt 0r defeat the potential
lawsuit;

disruption of the potential lawsuit;
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a causal relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability t0 prove the

5.

lawsuit;

and

damages.

6.

Id. 352.

If Idaho follows these elements, then the Appellant has adequately plead a claim for

negligent and/or intentional spoliation 0f evidence.

As

both

the public agency charged With the

investigation into the accident that caused the death of Raymond’s father Barry Johnson, the ISP

had

either voluntarily taken

on the

duty, or

had some regulatory or statutory duty

to preserve

evidence With regard t0 such investigation. Without question, there existed the potential of a

wrongful death lawsuit related to such investigation.
agents engaged in a

Raymond

number of destructive and damaging

With key evidence, in particular ﬁndings by the

initial

alleges that the ISP superiors

actions that destroyed and/or tampered

ISP investigators that the deputy that

caused the accident acted recklessly and that alcohol use by Mr. Johnson was not a

Raymond also

and

factor.

alleges that the ISP’S outrageous conduct related to criminal proceedings

prevented felony negligence charges from being pursued against the deputy that would have
resulted in per se liability against the deputy and his employer in her case.

criminal conviction against the deputy and/or an untampered and

Without question, a

unimpeded investigatory report

from the ISP would have been crucial evidence for Raymond’s wrongful death claim. Instead
the ISP’S actions caused signiﬁcant delays and

prove than
detail

it

it

difﬁcult to

should have been. She alleges damages caused by such actions (as discussed in

supra in Section V).

evidence,

made Raymond’s claim much more

Thus, even

if the

ISP did not “intend” t0 destroy 0r tamper with

violated duties t0 preserve such evidence

spoliation 0f evidence claim.
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— therefore

resulting in a negligent

Raymond has
Montana

also clearly plead a claim for “intentional” spoliation 0f evidence under the

standard, a claim

Which has fewer elements because 0f the inherently “impropriety” 0r

egregiousness of such conduct. She alleges that the ISP engaged in measures to protect the

deputy and his employer from

liability,

by purposefully tampering With and destroying key

evidence that would have been crucial to her wrongful death claims. Again, although
the ISP’S wrongful conduct

was geared toward shielding

the deputy

from criminal

much of

liability,

the

ISP should have easily foreseen that such conduct would “disrupt” or “defeat” Raymond’s
liability

claims in her civil lawsuit. Hence, such actions rise t0 the level 0f “intentional”

spoliation 0f evidence.

Raymond

alleges real

damages

as a result 0f such conduct, discussed

supra in Section V.
In sum, While the district court declined t0 appropriately and fully consider Whether Idaho

has or should recognize a spoliation claim for the ISP’S egregious conduct, nothing prevents this

Court on a de nova review from allowing such a claim as applied to the allegations in
In so doing, this Court will not be

to

this case.

on untrodden ground, but has sound principles and precedent

draw upon from nearby jurisdictions

to support such a claim.

The Respondent’s Alleged Immoral Conduct and the Severity 0f the Harm t0
Appellant Rises t0 the Level 0f a “Prima Facia” Tort under Restatement§ 870.

IV.

It

may be possible that the Appellant’s

claims d0 not neatly ﬁt within a spoliation 0f

evidence claim 0r that some of the wrongful conduct committed by the Respondent
necessarily related t0 destruction 0r tampering of evidence.

Whether an additional 0r separate

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF -

l4

tort

As

is

not

such, this Court should consider

claim should be permitted under

§

870 0f the Restatement

of Law Which
tort.

this

Court has recognized as a “catch

Rest. Torts, 2nd

§

870.

all”

Yoakum 129 Idaho

(See,

The Respondent’s response

t0 the Appellant’s

provision for un-traditional categories 0f

923 P.2d

at 178,

at 423).

arguments 0n the application 0f § 870

again leans heavily 0n the Temple Coumjy Hospital decision and attempts t0 downplay 0r
disregard

much 0f the Appellant’s

allegations

Section

why this

II infra.

off as “vague.”

made by the Appellant 0n this

lacking and does not truly refute the points

of reasons

— passing them

This response

issue.

The multitude

Court should not follow Temple County Hospital are discussed

However, given the unique and unusual considerations

hereby provides additional basis and support for

why the

is

at length in

at play, the

Appellant

Court should allow such a

tort in this

case.

The inclusion 0f § 870

t0 the

Restatement 0f Torts 2nd

0f common law, legal trends, and policy considerations.
of the history 0f this
Southern
C0.,

District,

SD35102

Which has

Holmes

its

tort,

see “Concurring Opinion

June 18, 2018). Historically,

roots in a 1904 United States

in Aikens

v.

it

the culmination 0f the evolution

For a thorough and excellent recitation

Appendix A”

Second Division decision Billingsley

(dec.

is

v.

t0 Missouri

Court 0f Appeals

Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance

has been referred to as a “prima facie” tort

Supreme Court Opinion by

Justice Oliver

Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S.Ct. 3, 49 L.Ed. 154 (1904).

Wendell

As

conceptualized by Holmes: "Prima facie, the intentional inﬂiction 0f temporal damages

cause 0f action Which as a matter 0f substantive law, Whatever
requires a justiﬁcation if the defendant

"disinterested malevolence" or

When
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is to

escape." Id.

is

a

may be the form 0f the pleading,

Holmes

also refers t0 the notion 0f

ordinarily lawful conduct that in actuality

was not done

t0

achieve a beneﬁcial end for the actor but was done solely with a malevolent intent to injure the
plaintiff, the

conduct became actionable.

Id.

After the Aikens decision, the concept of a prima facie tort developed in various forms

and reservations, with

§

870 0f the Restatement (drafted

resolve and “balance the interests.” Id. See

recommend that
that individuals

Which there

is

in determining

must bear

whether a prima facia

comment

h.

The

The Restatement comments

e.

balances the “harms

composed With many individuals”

“If the

means

is illegal

allegations in this case

allegations, if true,

show that

for

as clearly entitled t0 the

“severity” 0f the harm, including the “signiﬁcance 0f the emotional

test.

Id.

harm”

is

an

The “motive” and “means” 0f the defendant
and legal character” 0f the conduct.

or unfair 0r immoral according to the

understanding 0f society this constitutes a factor favoring

The

an attempt to

f.

also “a very important factor,” in particular the “moral

comment

and

tort exists, the court

as the price 0f living in a society

“important consideration” in this balancing

is

c., d.

n0 cause 0f action with “other types 0f harm are just

protection of the law.” Id.

The

comments

in 1977) representing

Id.

common

liability.” Id.

d0 clearly meet the requisite threshold for a prima

instead 0f promoting and enforcing the law as

it is

facia tort.

charged and

obligated to d0, the state’s chief law enforcement agency ISP instead prevented justice and

protected a law breaker.
in his capacity as a

More

disconcerting

is

that the person the

ISP was protecting was acting

law enforcement ofﬁcer when he broke the law. In other words, the ISP’S

actions put itself and the interests of another law enforcement ofﬁcer in the course of duty above
the law. Indeed 5

it is

difﬁcult t0 envision a
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more “immoral” and “unfair”

act in societ

.

The

severity of the

harm

to the Appellant

Raymond is

being able t0 rely and trust upon the ISP to properly conduct

of the person

who

killed her father, the

but the enormous emotional

toll

on

forward wrongful death claim in which

and weight 0f the

state’s police force,

its

investigation into the culpability

agency did the opposite. The consequences

are crushing, not only in terms 0f her right to obtain justice

father,

also readily apparent. Instead of

to

and compensation for the

Raymond

loss

of her

Instead 0f being able t0 pursue a fairly straight

her.

liability is clear,

she ﬁnds herself up against the power

which would much prefer

t0 protect the

person

Who

killed

her father than allow her justice. The natural result for any person in this situation would likely

be severe anxiety and depression caused by
loss

this

upside-down approach by law enforcement. The

of faith and conﬁdence in law enforcement would be a source of grief and fear in

Will be discussed further supra in Section V, the

In conclusion, as envisioned

damages

by the Restatement

itself.

As

are clear.

drafters

and the great Justice Holmes, the

law should not allow serious and obviously harmful conduct from being actionable just because a
recognized

tort

“escape” from

has yet t0 emerge to provide relief for such conduct. There should be no such
liability for the

wrong-doer. Yet that

is

precisely

What the Respondent

is

suggesting this Court do. The Appellant should be allowed t0 proceed with a prima facia tort for
the

wrongs blatantly committed by the Respondent.
V.

The Respondent’s Inherently Wrongful Conduct, and the Character 0f the
Wrongful Conduct Itself Naturally Results in Damages that Can be Determined
by the Jury.
Respondent also suggests

to this

Court that the Appellant’s alleged damages cannot be

“proven” and that such damages are “speculative.” Here again, the Respondent
take advantage 0f the uncertainty caused
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by

its

own

is

attempting to

actions t0 avoid liability. Additionally,

Respondent

is

disregarding basic concepts of types of damages that have been plead and are

allowed for the caused harms.
In this case, the Appellant

is

seeking both special, general and compensatory damages.

“Special damages” arise from “the special circumstances 0f the case” which the law “presumes
0r implies from the

mere invasion 0f the

plaintiff” s rights.”

22

Am Jur 2d Damages

§ 43.

General damages are those “that are the natural and necessary result of the wrongful act or

omission asserted as the foundation 0f liability. In other words, general damages are those Which
are traceable t0,

Finally,

and probably the necessary

“compensatory damages” compensate pecuniary

occurred, but future losses. 22

feelings

Am Jur 2d Damages

§ 29.

it

is

Am Jur 2d Damages

Such damages

also include

§ 42.

have

“wounded

losses. Id.

applies t0 spoliation claims and prima facia torts, due to the nature of such torts,

latitude is given to the jury t0 ascertain

approach

22

losses, not only for losses that

and mental anguish” and under such non-economic

As
Wide

result 0f, the injury.”

such damages. The general policy for such an

explained by the United States Supreme Court which suggests that the inability to

prove precise damages due

“making amends”

t0 the “nature

0f the tort” should not prevent wrongdoer from

for his wrongful acts:

Where

the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment 0f the amount 0f
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice t0
deny all relief t0 the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any
amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it Will be enough if the evidence show the extent 0f the damages as
a matter ofjust and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness
and precision that would be possible if the case, Which he alone is responsible for
making, were otherwise. .As the Supreme Court 0f Michigan has forcefully declared, the
risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer, instead of upon the injured
party. .Juries are allowed t0 act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and
.

.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF -

18

And when, from the

amount 0f the damages cannot
be estimated With certainty, or only a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no
obj ection to placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances 0f the case having any
tendency t0 show damages, 0r their probable amount; so as t0 enable them t0 make the
most intelligible and probable estimate which the nature 0f the case Will permit. .To deny
the injured party the right t0 recover any actual damages in such cases, because they are
0f a nature which cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties t0 proﬁt
positive, proof.

nature of the case, the

.

own wrongs, encourage Violence, and invite depredation.
the law, though cases may be found Where courts have laid

by, and speculate upon, their

Such

and cannot be,
and arbitrary rules Which have produced such a result. Whatever of
uncertainty there may be in this mode of estimating damages is an uncertainty caused by
the defendant's own wrongful act, and justice and sound public policy alike require that
he should bear the risk 0f the uncertainty thus produced.

down

is

not,

artiﬁcial

Story Parchment C0.

v.

Paterson Parchment Paper C0., 51 S.Ct. 248, 250-51, 282 U.S. 555,

564-65 75 (193 1) (citations omitted).
Jurisdictions that

this approach.

have adopted a spoliation 0f evidence cause 0f action have followed

Such justiﬁcation

is

well stated

by

the

Montana Supreme Court

in Stimpson:

Generally, a plaintiff is required t0 prove damages with reasonable certainty. However,

we have previously

stated that

defendant should not escape

When there

liability

is

strong evidence of the fact 0f damage, a

because the amount of damage cannot be proven

with precision. .The speculative nature of damages
.

proof relevant to the

is

inherent in the uncertainties 0f

of spoliation of evidence. Thus, the interest of the plaintiff to
the
entire
amount
of damages that he would have received if the underlying
recover
tort

action had been pursued successfully

must be balanced with the defendant's

interest in

not providing the plaintiff with a windfall. The plaintiff should not be allowed to beneﬁt

more from

the spoliation than he

would have

in the underlying suit.

On the

other hand,

the defendant should be adequately punished for his offending conduct and should be

required to adequately compensate the plaintiff for the loss of his ability to pursue the

underlying

Stimpson

at

suit.

351.

In essence, this Court should not excuse the Respondent’s alleged wrongful conduct,

Which

in itself, resulted in

an uncertainty 0f damages. That would be a perverse application of

the law. Additionally, Appellant has plead a
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number of non-economic damages including

emotional distress, anguish and so forth resulting from the Respondent’s conduct which has

always been recognized by Idaho as allowable damages.
In regard to the loss 0f value t0 a prospective claim resulting

the

Montana Court has suggested a formula

by

spoliation of evidence,

that balances the uncertainties:

In taking these interests into consideration,

it is

to account for the uncertainties. Therefore,

necessary for the damages t0 be discounted

we

hold that damages arrived

reasonable estimation based on relevant data should be multiplied
possibility that the plaintiff would

have

won the underlying

suit

by

at

through

the signiﬁcant

had the spoliated evidence

been available. For example, if a jury determined that the expected recovery in the
underlying suit was $200,000 and that there was an estimated 6O percent possibility that
the plaintiff would have recovered that amount in the underlying suit had it not been
impaired by the spoliated evidence, then the award 0f damages would be $120,000 (6O
percent 0f $200,000).
Stimpson

at

351-52.

There

is

no reason

that a similar

approach could not be taken in the Appellant’s case,

despite the fact that the underlying case has been resolved. If Appellant can prove that the

Respondent did
(0r

in fact interfere With, destroy 0r otherwise

any other such prima facia

tort),

there

is

tamper With the evidence in her cause

nothing that prevents a jury from determining the

value 0f her claim had the wrongful conduct not occurred. Indeed, a jury
to determine pecuniary

amounts based upon

less than

complete

instruction can be formulated that balances all of the interests

Additionally, the questions regarding

complex and uncertain

as the

Respondent

is

damages

facts.

is

routinely requested

An appropriate jury

and uncertainties.

for the Appellant’s loss

leading the Court to believe.

Raymond simply

needs to show what the evidence would have been had the ISP not engaged in
tortious conduct.

With an untainted investigatory

the death of Mr. Johnson, liability
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report

would have been

of claim are not as

its

wrongful and

showing reckless behavior

clear.

that

The jury would simply need

caused

t0

determine What the damages would have been

if liability

were clearly

established. This is a

question well within the province 0f a jury. Moreover, damages could be appropriately awarded
for the delays

—

including statutory interest. Given the passage 0f time in this case, this Will not

be an unsubstantial amount.
Finally, as overlooked

special damages.

As

is

true in

by

the Respondent, the Respondent has alleged

any

case, the jury Will consider all

non-economic and

of the factors and evidence to

determine an appropriate amount of damages for these types of injuries.

The appeal should

therefore be granted.

N0

VI.

Basis Exists for the

Awarding 0f Respondent’s Attorney

Respondent has also requested

that this

Court award

its

Fees.

Attorney Fees on appeal. This

request in itself is brought “frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation” pursuant t0

§ 41.

At

the very least, the authorities are split

framework and recognized authority

laid the

provided ample reason

why her damages

IAR

0n the issues presented on appeal and Idaho has

for the Appellant’s claims.

are not based

The Appellant has

0n “speculation” but

also

are inherent within

the claims.

Without

citing t0

any authority or any part of the record, Respondent argues

Appellant’s claims against the ISP have been

somehow

“litigated”

and

that

“settled.” This is a

specious and Wholly un-supported claim. Finally, the Court should note that the Respondent did
not seek nor receive an award 0f attorney fees

and

it is

curious as to

Simply put, n0 basis

why it now believes

exists

it

by

the district court for the dismissal 0f the case,

should be entitled t0 attorney fees 0n appeal.

whatsoever for the awarding 0f Respondent’s attorney
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fees.

CONCLUSION
Pursuant t0 the foregoing, this Court should grant Raymond’s appeal and remand the case
for further proceedings.

DATED

this 24th

day 0f May, 2019.

PETERSEN Moss HALL

/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
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I

correct

hereby certify that on

this 24th

day of May, 2019,

I

caused to be served a true and

copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed

following:

Persons Served:

Method 0f Service:

Michael J. Elia, Esq.
Marisa S. Crecelius, Esq.

(X) iCourt eFile/eServe

MOORE,
P.O.

ELIA,

KRAFT & HALL, LLP

Box 6756

Boise, Idaho 83707

FAX: (208) 336-7031
EMAIL: mje@melawﬁrm.net
marisa@melawﬁrm.net
/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
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